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Abstract
Aiming at the problem of reverse auction which involves 
one buyer and multiple sellers in procurement market, 
this paper studies about online reverse auction via internet 
during which different sellers arrive at different time and 
bid, and the buyer makes decision whether to purchase 
after receiving each bid. And then, the random pricing 
strategy of online reverse auction is researched. After the 
compare with single pricing strategy, it shows that the 
random pricing strategy using the market information to 
make a procurement price can avoid the waste of cost and 
incomplete procurement,  and a case test is provided in 
the end.
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INTRODUCTION
How to use the new procurement technology and 
operational mode to transform and manage the supply 
chain and procurement processes, then reduce the 
procurement costs and improve efficiency is becoming 
more and more concerned and paid attention. The 
FreeMarkets Company which was established in 1995 by 
Glen Meakem is the earliest one who used online reverse 
auction, which is innovative for traditional procurement 
mode. Reverse auction is one kind of procurement which 
makes a decision after the end of bidding. With the 
intensification of the time effect on the procurement cost, 
reverse auction participants are not willing to wait for 
the results for a long time. Waiting means that the time 
cost increases, as well as loss new purchases and sales 
opportunities, so online reverse auction was proposed. 
Online reverse auction is that sellers arrive at different 
time and bid, the decision whether to buy the bidders’ 
goods needs to be made  immediately after the buyer 
receives each bid. Reverse auction in application process 
gradually gets into transparent equalization. Buyers make 
public supplier’s information and bidding to change the 
incomplete information into complete information. The 
supplier’s competition is more intense under the complete 
information, which will bring lower prices, higher quality 
suppliers, and reduce the procurement costs. In practice, 
the online reverse auction becomes prevalent in Europe 
and the U.S. since 2000, which has a reverse bid process 
via internet. Compared with traditional negotiation, this 
kind of auction can save costs up to 11%-12% for buyers. 
In this paper, we will mainly study the random pricing 
strategy of online reverse auction, with comparative 
analysis to the single pricing strategy.
1.  LITERATURE REVIEW
With the development of E-business, it is common to 
buy and sell goods via internet. The researches on online 
reverse auctions began from auction research in the first 
deriving from McAfee, R. P. and J. McMillan’s (1986) 
agent competitive strategy analysis and government 
procurement mathematical model in the commissioned 
agency theory. Subsequently, Dasgupta. S and D. F. 
Spulber (1989) analyze the reverse auction strategy 
problem of the procurement management. CHEN (1999) 
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summarizes the quantities of the reverse auction and 
strategic equilibrium of price auction on the basis of the 
aforementioned studies, and comparatively analyzes 
the efficiency of the different auction mechanisms. The 
research of online reverse auction model and algorithm 
mostly focus on the online algorithms and competitive 
analysis methods growing up in computer science. 
Ron Lavi and Noam Nisan (2000) study the online 
auctions that after bidders arriving at different time the 
auction mechanism must make decision immediately 
after receipt of each bid, they also take advantage of 
the competition analysis in the worst case to identify 
the auctioneer optimal supply curve, based on which 
the online auction mechanism is very competitive. Alan 
Smart and Alan Harrison (2003) study the role in buyer-
supplier relationships of online reverse auctions. Avrim 
Blum, Tuomas Sandholm and Martin Zinkevich (2006) 
put online learning applications in digital goods online 
auction, get a new digital goods auction model and a 
constant competition ratio on the optimal auction revenue 
under fixed price, and apply the technology applications 
in the design of online auction mechanism. 
The goods purchased through reverse auction are 
generally standardized goods, of which the true valuation 
of the supplier is generally converge, so the majority of 
the bids usually fluctuate within a relatively small range. 
Buyers provide complete information to suppliers, and 
then a phenomenon appear that all bids of suppliers are 
concentrated in a range because of the fierce competition 
to get the object with smaller advantage. Because buyers 
can not understand this small range, their valuations 
of the commodity usually belong to a large range, in 
which a single pricing is likely to be too high to cause 
waste of cost, or be set so low that reverse auction 
comes to nothing, so that the procurement tasks can not 
be completed. With the help of researches on online 
algorithms and competitive analysis methods by many 
other scholars (XU, XU, & LU, 2005; DING & XU, 
2007; XIN, XU, & YI, 2007; XU & XU; 2008), this 
paper studies the random pricing strategy of online 
reverse auction in which all bids in competition are more 
concentrated, and comparative analysis with a single 
pricing proves that when a random pricing strategy of 
online reverse auction takes advantage of the market price 
information, the disadvantages of single pricing caused 
such as the waste of cost or unable to complete the task of 
procurement can be overcome.
2.  PROBLEM DESCRIPTION
Assuming buyers want to buy a certain type of 
standardized non-market exclusive products, and select a 
purchase items from a number of suppliers, and suppliers 
can meet the number of purchasing items of buyers. 
According to the complete information provided by the 
buyer, in each stage of the bidding process of online 
reverse auction, suppliers give different bids in different 
time, and change the bids in accordance with the changes 
of other suppliers. Suppliers bid on the one hand are based 
on their own reservation price, on the other hand are 
based on the bids of other suppliers at any time to adjust, 
and maximize their expected utility with lower prices. 
When the expected utility falls to the minimum margin, 
the price will no longer be reduced. According to the pre-
determined procurement strategy, the buyer can analysis 
the bids of suppliers, determine the most suitable purchase 
price, and close a deal with a supplier. Overall, in this 
process, the buyer always expects that the price is more 
and more lower to achieve the maximum expected utility 
by reducing procurement costs.
3.  MODELING AND ANALYSIS
A buyer usually determines his own pricing strategy 
independently, but as a seller, the supplier can refer to 
the bids of other multiple suppliers to determine his own 
bidding strategy, whose goal of participating in the auction 
is to maximize expected utility (DING & XU, 2007). In 
general, it should be set up in advance when the bid of 
online reverse auction begins. In this article, it is assumed 
that the buyer can end the auction at any time based on the 
price situation during the online reverse auction process, 
also he can end the auction if his bid price is higher 
enough for the supplier to win the bidding, or end the 
auction because one buyer of urgent demand for the goods 
is willing to purchase at the bid price of the time.
Given an online reverse auction A, in which there are 
n suppliers. Assume that the i -th bidder’s real valuation 
of goods is vi (i = 1,2...,n), his quoted price is bi, and 
the buyer pay the i-th bidder a price of pi. If pi ≥ bi, 
transaction maybe occurred, then the i -th bidder’s utility 
is Ui = pi - vi. If pi < bi, transaction will not occur, the 
bidder’s utility is 0.
Now let’s consider about an online reverse auction 
problem with the objective of minimum cost. For any bid 
sequence L, CA(L)  is taken to be the cost that the online 
reverse auction A  makes an instant decision of bidding 
sequence L, and C 'A (L) indicates the decision-making cost 
if the bidding sequence L is known in advance. If there is a 
constant r  independent of the bidding sequence L, which 
meets CA(L) ≤ r·C 'A(L), then the competitive ratio is α, 
which shows the better between the optimal procurement 
costs in the two cases. This analysis process of the online 
algorithms performance is called competitive analysis.
Therefore, before the analysis of random pricing 
strategy of online reverse auction, it needs firstly to study 
the single pricing condition, and thus to analyze the 
competitive performance of random pricing strategy.
3.1  Optimal Single Pricing
If the buyer has determined a purchase price before online 
LIU Zhongcheng; LI Hongyu (2013). 
International Business and Management, 6(2), 71-76
73 Copyright © Canadian Research & Development Center of Sciences and Cultures
reverse auction, the first supplier whose bid price is less 
than or equal to this purchase price will close a deal with 
the buyer. This online reverse auction strategy is called 
online single pricing strategy (abbreviated as the online 
SP strategy).
If the buyer has an estimated range [B1, B2] of the 
commodity price, then assumed that the single price is 
set to B3, if the price is set too low, there is probably not 
one supplier can win the bidding all the way, the buyer 
has to purchase at the last-minute bid price because of the 
procurement time limit, and if B3 is set too high, the online 
reverse auction may soon close a deal, but can not achieve 
the goal of saving costs. From the competitive analysis 
point of view:
If the bid price B1 doesn’t appear in procurement time, 
the cost ratio of online and offline is B3 /B1.
If the bid price below the single fixed price doesn’t 
appear all the way during the procurement time, and the 
final bid price comes to the ceiling, then the cost ratio of 
online and offline is B2/B3.
So given the single fixed price B3, the competition ratio 
of this online reverse auction is rSP = sup{B3 /B1, B2 /B3}, 
and the optimal B3 should be the solution of the equation 
B3/B1=B2/B3 because the price makes the rsp minimum 
value, then 213 BBB ⋅= , so rSP 12 / BBSP = .
3.2  Random Pricing Strategy and Competitive 
Analysis
3.2.1  Random Pricing Strategy
With complete information, if the bid prices of suppliers 
are more concentrated, the buyer needs to analyze all 
the bid prices of small difference. Then, we will apply 
the random pricing strategy of online reverse auction 
(abbreviated online reverse auction RP strategy) to 
analyze the supplier’s bids in competition.
Let the estimated range [B1, B2] of the buyer about 
the commodity price be separated into m subintervals, 
m∆∆∆ ,,2,1  ,  w h e r e  ),( 1 ii cci −=∆ ,  i  =  1 , 2 . . . , m . 
Assuming the selected number of bid prices up to n (that 
is, up to the n -th bid auction will end), now let the right 
end point c1of the first subinterval (c0, c1) be the minimum 
reserve price, and assuming the price making sequence is 
p1, p2,..., pn that is to make the price pi for the commodity 
of the i -th bidder, then the random pricing strategy of 
online reverse auction is as follows:
●  The probability of price p1 made for the 
commodity of the first supplier meets Pr (p1 = 
c1) = 1, if the first bid price b1 ≤ c1, the purchase 
price is c1. Otherwise, the transaction will be 
unsuccessful, and then look at the second bid.
●  Assuming b2 falls into the subinterval )1( ≠∆ kk , 
then the price p2 made for the commodity of the 
second supplier satisfies 
n
ncpPr
1)( 12
−
== , Pr (p2 
= ck) = 1/n, and if the second bid price b2 ≤ c1, then 
the transaction will be successful, so the probability 
of  price c1 in the successful deal is n
n 1−
, as the 
probability of price ck in the deal is 1/n. If c1<b2≤ck, 
then the probability of a successful deal is 1/n, and the 
bargain price is ck. If b2 > ck, the transaction can not be 
reached, then see the third bid.
●  Usually, the probability of the price pi made for 
the commodity of the i -th supplier satisfies:
))( 21 n
Nn
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m
j
j
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∑
=
−
==
, 
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n
N
cpP jjir ==
, j=2,3,...m (1)
where Nj represents the number of bid prices falling 
into the j -th subinterval of the front i -1 suppliers.
3.2.2  Competitive Analysis
If bid prices of all suppliers concentrate in a subinterval 
with a length of λ within the valuation interval [B1, B2] 
of the buyer, then split [B1, B2] to several small intervals 
with each length of λ/k, and suppose that there are nbid 
prices concentrating in a small area [α, α+λ], then all bid 
prices will fall into at most k+1 segmented subintervals. 
According to the random pricing strategy of online reverse 
auction, the worst case is that the transaction is concluded 
at the price of α+λ+λ/k with the probability of 
n
n 1− , and 
no deal is closed with the probability of 1/n, then the buyer 
has to purchase at the price ceiling B2. So the expected cost 
( 1)( / )( )RP
n kE C
n n
α λ α λ λ+ − + +
≤ + , while the offline 
optimal cost is α , then the ratio of expected cost ( )RPE C  
and offline optimal cost α  is:
( 1)( / )
( )RP
a n a k
E C n n
a a
λ λ λ+ − + +
+
=
1 1
1 11a n n
a n ka B n kB
λ λ λ λ+ − −
≤ + ⋅ ≤ + + ⋅  (2)
When the interval is split up into much more 
smal le r  sub in te rva l s ,  namely,  i f  ∞→k ,  t hen : 
1 1 1
( ) 1lim lim (1 ) 1RP
k k
E C n
B n kB B
λ λ λ
α→∞ →∞
−
= + + ⋅ = + ,  a n d 
( )
sup RPRP
E Cr
α
= , that is, when the valuation range is 
split up infinitely, rRP approximates to 
1
1
B
λ
+ .
If ∞→k , then:
When λ=0, rRP→1..
When λ=B2-B1,
2
1
RP
Br
B
→ .
Research on Pricing Strategy of Online Reverse 
Auction Based on Complete Information
74Copyright © Canadian Research & Development Center of Sciences and Cultures
When 
1
1
B
λ
+ <
2 1/B B
, i.e. when
1 2 1[0, ]B B Bλ ∈ −
, rRP < rSP, now the competitive performance of random pricing 
strategy is better than that of optimal single pricing strategy.
Therefore, the smaller the λ is, the smaller rRP is too. 
That is, the more concentrated the bid prices are, the 
closer the expected cost of random pricing strategy is to 
the offline optimal cost. So, even if the buyer does not 
know the fluctuant cost range of suppliers, he can also 
adjust gradually the probability of bid price making by 
random pricing strategy, so that the expected cost of the 
online close offline optimal cost.
4.  CASE TEST
4.1  Case Description
An assembly production enterprise wants to procure 
a number of parts from multiple suppliers. Because 
assembled commodities parts has the characteristics such 
as purchasing large quantities and high standardization, 
the enterprise decides to use multi-stage online reverse 
auction by using bulk procurement of multi-channel. 
During online reverse auction, the buyer will firstly audit 
and evaluate the suppliers who applied online to determine 
their participation eligibility, then get price information of 
each supplier and eliminate weaker competitive suppliers 
to determine those outright ones. Finally, the buyer can 
distribute the order form to complete the procurement for 
the minimum purchase cost.
The detailed procurement process of this enterprise is 
described as follows:
(1) The number attributes of supplier 
Because of bulk purchasing, the buyer needs to 
divide an order into multi orders to respectively procure. 
According to the number attributes of the procurement 
goods and each batch procurement number range, in this 
case, 3 suppliers are needed, and at most one supplier 
is selected in each procurement stage, so at least there 
are 3 stages of the bidding. For the simplicity of test, 
assuming that one supplier is chosen in each stage and the 
procurement needs 3 stages to be finished.
(2) Assuming that that buyers’ understanding of this 
product price is limited to a certain price range [48, 72], 
the initial price is set at b0=60, because the supplier’s bid 
would be more concentrated in the less bid interval, the 
buyer will put every 10 bids into a stage.
To easily establish the model, we assume that 
the bidding sequence number is the serial number of 
suppliers, which is shown in Table 1, 2, 3.
Table 1
Price List 1 of Online Reverse Auction
Series number 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Competitive tender 63 64 65 63 61 62 61 60 62 60
Supplier 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Table 2
Price List 2 of Online Reverse Auction
Series number 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Competitive tender 56 59 58 58 57 55 56 54 55 54
Supplier 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
Table 3
Price List 3 of Online Reverse Auction
Series number 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Competitive tender 53 53 54 52 53 54 52 51 52 52
Supplier 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30
4.2  Pricing
As we can see the bidding sequence from Table 1, 2, 3, in 
this transaction period if we consider the optimal offline 
purchasing transaction price that it is clearly 59. The optimal 
single price is 1 2 48 72 58.8B B⋅ = × = , and the ratios 
of the optimal single pricing strategy to the optimal offline 
purchases is 2 1/ 1.22SPr B B= = . Obviously, 59≤ 58.8×
1.22, that is to say that applying single pricing strategy 
to procure is better than offline purchases. But according 
to single pricing strategy to procure, apparently it can not 
quickly make deal. Because the previous bidding prices are 
not lower than 59, the buyer may lose the opportunity after 
waiting for a long time. Even the procurement can not be 
completed during the limited time of online reverse auction.
(1) Using the RP strategy of online reverse auction to 
price the first phase bids, the analysis is as follows:
Divide [48, 72] into 8 small pieces [48, 51], [51, 54], 
[54, 57], [57, 60], [60, 63], [63, 66],[66, 69], [69, 72], the 
pricing and probability sequence is as follows:
1) Pr(p1=51)=1, and b1=63, So the transaction can not 
be reached.
2) Pr(P2=51)=9/10, Pr(p2=63)=1/10, and b2=64, So 
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the transaction can not be reached.
3 )  P r ( P 3 = 5 1 ) = 8 / 1 0 ,  P r ( p 3 = 6 3 ) = 1 / 1 0 , 
Pr(p3=66)=1/10, and b3=65, So the probability of the 
deal is 1/10, the transaction value is 66.
4 )  P r ( p 4 = 5 1 ) = 7 / 1 0 , P r ( p 4 = 6 3 ) = 1 / 1 0 , P r
(p4=66)=2/10, and b4=63, So the probability of the deal 
is 1/10, the transaction value is 63.
5) Pr(p5=51)=6/10,Pr(p5=63)=2/10,Pr(p5=60)=2/10, 
and b5=61 , So  the probability of the deal is 2/10, the 
transaction value is 63.
6) Pr(p6=51)=5/10,Pr(p6=63)=3/10,Pr(p6=66)=2/10, 
and b6=62, So the probability of the deal is 3/15, the 
transaction value is 63.
7) Pr(p7=51)=4/10,Pr(p7=63)=4/10,Pr(p7=66)=2/10, 
and b7=61, So the probability of the deal is 4/10, the 
transaction value is 63.
8) Pr(p8=51)=3/10,Pr(p8=63)=5/10,Pr(p8=66)=2/10, 
and b8=60, So the probability of the deal is 5/10, the 
transaction value is 63.
9) Pr(p9=51)=2/10 ,Pr(p9=63)=6/10,Pr(p9=60)=2/10, 
and b9=62, So the probability of the deal is 6/10, the 
transaction value is 63.
1 0 )  P r( p 1 0= 5 1 ) = 1 / 1 0  , P r ( p 1 0 = 6 3 ) = 7 / 1 0 , P r
(p10=66)=2/10 , and b10=60, So the probability of the 
deal is 9/10, the probability of the transaction value which 
equals 63 is 7/10, the probability of the transaction value 
which equals 66 is 2/10.
The ratio of the expected cost in this procurement 
stage to the optimal offline cost is competitive ratio:
( ) 1sup 1.06rpRP
E C a n ka kr
a na n ka
λ λ λ+ − + +
= = + ⋅ =
(2) Using the RP strategy of online reverse auction to 
price the second phase bids, the analysis is as follows:
Divide [48, 72] into 8 small pieces [48, 51], [51, 54], 
[54, 57], [57, 60], [60, 63], [63, 66], [66, 69], [69, 72] , 
the pricing and probability sequence is as follows:
1) Pr(p1=51)=1, and b1=56, So the transaction can not 
be reached. 
2) Pr(p2=51)=9/10, Pr(p2=57)=1/10, and b2=59, So 
the transaction can not be reached. 
3) Pr(p3=51)=8/10, Pr(p3=57)=1/10, Pr(p3=60)=1/10, 
and b3=58, So the probability of the deal is 1/10, the 
transaction value is 60. 
4) Pr(p4=51)=7/10, Pr(p4=57)=1/10, Pr(p4=60)=2/10, 
and b4=58, So the probability of the deal is 2/10, the 
transaction value is 60. 
5) Pr(p5=51)=6/10,Pr(p5=57)=2/10, Pr(p5=60)=2/10, 
and b5=56, So the probability of the deal is 1/10, the 
transaction value is 57. 
6) Pr(p6=51)=5/10, Pr(p6=57)=3/10, Pr(p6=60)=2/10, 
and b6=55, So the probability of the deal is 2/15, the 
transaction value is 57.
7) Pr(p7=51)=4/10, Pr(p6=57)=3/10, Pr(p6=60)=3/10, 
and b7=56, So the probability of the deal is 3/10, the 
transaction value is 57. 
8) Pr(p8=51)=3/10, Pr(p8=57)=4/10, Pr(p8=60)=3/10, 
and b8=54, So the probability of the deal is 4/10, the 
transaction value is 57. 
9) Pr(p9=51)=2/10, Pr(p9=57)=5/10, Pr(p9=60)=3/10, 
and b9=55, So the probability of the deal is 5/10, the 
transaction value is 57. 
1 0 )  P r ( p 1 0 = 5 1 ) = 1 / 1 0 ,  P r ( p 1 0 = 5 7 ) = 6 / 1 0 , 
Pr(p10=60)=3/10, and b10=54, So the probability of the 
deal is 9/10, the probability of the transaction value which 
equals 57 is 6/10, the probability of the transaction value 
which equals 60 is 3/10.
The ratio of the expected cost in this procurement 
stage to the optimal offline cost is competitive ratio:
( ) 1sup 1.06rpRP
E C a n ka kr
a na n ka
λ λ λ+ − + +
= = + ⋅ =
(3) Using the RP strategy of online reverse auction to 
price the third phase bids, the analysis is as follows:
Divide [48, 72] into 8 small pieces [48, 51], [51, 54], 
[54, 57], [57, 60], [60, 63], [63, 66], [66, 69], [69, 72] , 
the pricing and probability sequence is as follows:
1) Pr(p1=51)=1, and b1=53, So the transaction can not 
be reached. 
2) Pr(p2=51)=9/10, Pr(p2=54)=1/10, and b2=53, So the 
probability of the deal is 1/10, the transaction value is 54. 
3) Pr(p3=51)=8/10, Pr(p3=54)=2/10, and b3=54, So the 
probability of the deal is 2/10, the transaction value is 54. 
4) Pr(p4=54)=7/10, Pr(p4=54)=3/10, and b4=52, So the 
probability of the deal is 3/10, the transaction value is 54. 
5) Pr(p5=51)=6/10, Pr(p5=54), and , So the probability 
of the deal is 4/10, the transaction value is 54.
6) Pr(p6=51)=5/10, Pr(p6=54)=5/10, and b6=54, So the 
probability of the deal is 5/15, the transaction value is 54. 
7) Pr(p7=51)=4/10, Pr(p7)=54=6/10, and b7=52, So the 
probability of the deal is 6/10, the transaction value is 54. 
8) Pr(p8=51)=3/10, Pr(p8=54)=7/10, and b8=51, So the 
probability of the deal is 7/10, the transaction value is 54. 
9) Pr(p9=51)=2/10, Pr(p9=54)=8/10, and b9=52, So the 
probability of the deal is 8/10, the transaction value is 54. 
10) Pr(p10=51)=1/10, Pr(p10=54)=9/10, and b10=52, So 
the probability of the deal is 9/10, the transaction value is 54.
The ratio of the expected cost in this procurement 
stage to the optimal offline cost is competitive ratio:
( ) 1sup 1.07rpRP
E C a n ka kr
a na n ka
λ λ λ+ − + +
= = + ⋅ =
Obviously, it is better than the cost of offline 
purchasing by using online reverse auction RP strategy.
Although using the RP strategy can not make a deal 
soon, it is able to reflect the supplier's bidding information 
from the prices, and the probability of which the transaction 
price closes to the bidding prices of most suppliers is the 
largest. The buyer can conduct the transaction price and 
decide whether or not to choose the supplier.
From the bidding information of the three stages, 
according to the principle of highest probability, the price 
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in the first stage is 63, and the second phase of the price 
is set at 57, and the price of the third stage is 54. At this 
time, due to the supplier's bids are intensive, it may appear 
that several suppliers bid the same price, so the buyer can 
make the decision based on the evaluation of other aspects 
of the suppliers.
CONCLUSION
Aiming at the procurement problem that using online 
reverse auction to select a supplier, this paper studies 
the optimal single pricing strategy and random pricing 
strategy, using which the price made for the supplier 
is independent of has bid price. The latter can take 
advantage of market price information, correct the defects 
caused by static single pricing, besides, it has many other 
advantages such as full market information, low cost of 
transaction management, and excellent operability, etc. 
However, this strategy is applicable to the online reverse 
auction for standard commodities with bid prices more 
concentrated. It still needs further studies on the problem 
of more dispersive bid prices and big competitive ratio.
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